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If we are to develop efficient, reliable and secure means for sharing in-
formation across healthcare systems and organizations, then a careful 
analysis of human actions will be needed. To address this need, the HL7 
organization has proposed its Reference Information Model (RIM), 
which is designed to provide a comprehensive representation of the 
entire domain of healthcare centered around the phenomenon of human 
action. Taking the Basic Formal Ontology as our starting point, we 
examine the RIM from an ontological point of view, describing how it 
fails to provide a representation of the healthcare domain which would 
enjoy the sort of clarity, coherence, rigor and completeness that is 
claimed on its behalf. 
1. Introduction
Information and communication technology has not only altered the way 
that medical information is generated, stored, analyzed, and shared 
across and within healthcare organizations, it has also come to be 
associated with the promise that it will increase the safety, efficiency and 
cost-effectiveness of healthcare. The hope is that the electronic health 
record (EHR) and associated reporting, analysis and decision support 
technologies will facilitate the diffusion and dissemination of healthcare 
information, thereby allowing the systematic use of clinical guidelines 
* We dedicate this paper to Ingvar Johansson our friend and colleague at the
Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science (IFOMIS) from 
2002 to 2008. The interdisciplinary research group at IFOMIS included represent-
atives from ontology, biomedical informatics, and linguistics, and Ingvar himself 
contributed in important ways in all of these areas — including the peculiar inter-
action between ontology, medicine and speech act theory which forms our topic in 
what follows. 
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and outcomes measures in ways that will bring benefits to human health 
in the form of increased safety, effectiveness and economy.  
It has for long been clear, however, that many difficulties must be 
overcome before the promise of health informatics can be fully 
harvested. One such difficulty arises from the fact that the single doctor 
— single patient nexus has been largely superseded by a regime in 
which the typical patient is managed by a team of health care profes-
sionals, each specializing in one aspect of care. This is significant 
because different departments within a healthcare organization have 
different disciplinary cultures and employ different terminologies and 
data formats to talk about what are putatively the same phenomena. 
Current efforts to develop efficient means for sharing information across 
healthcare systems and organizations that have some prospect of over-
coming this and a range of similar problems must find effective ways to 
share information in an intuitive and stable way that ensures that mean-
ing is preserved.  
2. The Birth of the HL7 RIM 
To see how difficult a task this is, we describe one ambitious and highly 
influential effort to standardize healthcare information across the entire 
domain of healthcare that has been advanced by the Health Level 7 
(HL7) organization, one of several ANSI-accredited Standards Develop-
ing Organizations operating in the healthcare arena.1 
Already in the 1990s HL7 enjoyed considerable success through its 
creation of a widely used standard for healthcare messaging which was 
established as mandatory for communication between US Federal 
Government-funded healthcare organizations. This standard is now 
commonly referred to as HL7 version 2 — or v2, for short.2 v2 enabled 
healthcare applications to exchange clinical, demographic and admin-
istrative data in digital form on the basis of what we can think of as a 
walkie-talkie paradigm. Significantly, the v2 standard was designed to 
meet the interface requirements of the healthcare system in its entirety 
rather than focusing on the requirements of just one area of healthcare 
such as pharmacy, imaging services or insurance claims management.  
                                       
1 http://hl7.org, last accessed November 12, 2012. 
2 We here ignore the differences between successive sub-versions of the v2 stan-
dard. 
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Unfortunately, as v2 proved ever more popular, it also led to the cre-
ation of manifold v2 dialects, which over time brought about a situation 
in which messaging interoperability was maintained in many cases only 
within, and not between, healthcare organizations. Fatefully, the re-
sponse of the HL7 organization to this problem was to develop, starting 
in the 1990s, an abstract model of the entire domain of patient care 
called the Reference Information Model (RIM) that was intended to 
serve as a unified framework for the sharing of information and the 
usage of data across the entire domain of healthcare and to serve as a 
constraint on all subsequent HL7 standards. By regulating in this way 
what would be allowed to be communicated via subsequent v2-style 
HL7 messaging systems, v2’s problems of dialect formation would, it 
was hoped, be solved. 
3. HL7’s Act-Centered View of Healthcare 
The RIM starts out from the assumption that any profession or business, 
including healthcare, can be viewed as consisting primarily of a series of 
intentional actions on the part of responsible actors working within an 
organizational framework. The varieties of such intentional actions rel-
evant for healthcare include:  
assessment of health conditions (such as the taking of your pulse, or 
the weighing of your baby);  
provision of treatment services (such as performing surgery, or ad-
ministering drugs);  
informing of patients and their next of kin about health conditions;  
provision of notary services (such as the preparation of a living will);  
editing and maintaining of documents; 
ordering and accepting delivery of supplies; 
reporting to government agencies; 
billing;  
and many more.  
Interestingly, HL7 explicitly acknowledges the influence of philosophy 
in its creation of the RIM, whose act-centered view of healthcare draws 
for its underlying framework on the speech act theory developed by J. L. 
Austin in Austin (1962) and by John R. Searle in Searle (1969). 
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Austin and Searle were among the first philosophers to recognize the 
theoretical significance of the fact that what we can do with words goes 
well beyond uses of language of the statement-making sort.1 We can 
make requests, issue commands, make promises, ask questions, and so 
on, and actions of these sorts are marked by the fact that the very utter-
ance of words brings about some extra-linguistic result, as for example 
when the making of a promise brings about the result that the maker of 
the promise stands under a certain obligation to perform a certain act.  
Speech acts of different types, now, can share the same propositional 
content. Thus I can command that you open the door; I can suggest that 
you open the door; I can ask whether you will open the door; and so on. 
Moreover, as was recognized by pioneers of the logic of action,2 there is 
a sense in which this same propositional content can be shared also by 
actions of a non-linguistic sort, as when a command is obeyed or an 
instruction is followed. In virtue of this sharing of contents speech acts 
and other human actions form certain standard sorts of sequences, as 
when, for example, a question is followed by an answer, an act of trans-
mitting information is followed by an act of acknowledgement, a prom-
ise is followed by the performance of the promised act, or an act of 
ordering bedding supplies is followed by acts of, for example, trans-
porting, receiving, billing and paying for the bedding supplies delivered. 
The RIM sees this idea of shared propositional content as an attractive 
way of modeling how the domain of human actions is organized. In 
sequences such as the sort described, we are to utilize the same RIM 
‘classCode’ — for example ‘replenish bedding supplies!’ or ‘register 
this patient!’ or ‘administer this drug!’ — to capture the common 
content of what is involved in each successive act within the sequence, 
combined with a succession of different ‘moodCodes’ (such as ‘order’ 
or ‘command’) to capture what is peculiar about each succeeding act. 
The ‘model of healthcare information’ that is created in this way is seen 
by the authors of the RIM as providing an efficient and reliable frame-
work for ensuring successful communication of meaning within and be-
tween healthcare information systems. 
Of course there are many features of healthcare that go beyond the 
category of action. These include the participants of the actions them-
                                       
1 For a broader view of the history of speech act theory see Barry Smith (1990). 
2 See for example G. H. von Wright (1963). 
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selves, both agent and patient. They include the roles these participants 
play in actions, including their authority to perform given actions. They 
include the sorts of entities to which these actions give rise (Smith 
2003), such as obligations, claims and electronic documents. They in-
clude diseases, and the associated causal processes inside the organism, 
including processes such as birth and death. They include material ob-
jects such as pharmaceutical products, DNA samples, equipment and 
buildings, and they include organizations and institutional entities such 
as insurance companies, government agencies, and laboratories. All of 
these must be taken into consideration in a complete ontology of the 
healthcare domain. Ultimately, an ontologically adequate language for 
communication of healthcare information should have the resources to 
capture all of the items on this list and all of the different sorts of rela-
tions that hold between them, and to do this in a maximally intuitive way 
that is at the same time easily modifiable as the needs and practices of 
healthcare organizations change with time. 
4. The RIM Straightjacket  
HL7’s current documentation of the RIM standard appears in an Inter-
national Standards Organization (ISO) document entitled “Health in-
formatics: — HL7 version 3 — Reference information model — Release 
4”, and described as a “Draft International Standard (DIS)”.1 The docu-
ment serves as the basis for a ballot to establish the new Release 4 of the 
RIM as an ISO standard.2  
As the document makes clear, the RIM requires that all healthcare 
information will be organized in terms of just the six “backbone” classes 
presented in Table 1 below. As the reader will see, this Table comprises 
two lists, of descriptions, and of definitions, which seem (to us, at least) 
to be in various ways inconsistent, even though they are taken from a 
single document. It is difficult to write clearly about HL7 specifications 
when these specifications are themselves formulated in inconsistent 
ways. Moreover, there are a number of further problematic issues with 
the individual entries in these two lists. 
                                       
1 Health informatics: – HL7 version 3 – Reference information model – Release 4 
(Document: ISO/HL7 21731:2011(E)), http://standardsproposals.bsigroup.com/ 
Home/getPDF/1361, last accessed November 28, 2012. 
2 As we understand the matter, the proposal is to establish the RIM as an inter-
national standard for being the RIM. 
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First, they are marked by an embarrassing circularity, as for example 
in the definitions of ‘Entity’ and ‘Role’, which can be of no possible 
assistance to someone who does not already understand what HL7 takes 
to be the meaning of the terms defined. 
Second, are problems of ambiguity, for example when we are told that 
Act ‘represents the actions that are executed and must be documented as 
health care is managed and provided’ does this mean that actions volun-
tarily recorded do not fall under the heading of Act? Clarity, here, would 
demand a distinction, to which we shall return below, between health-




(from 0.2: “RIM as an 
abstract model”) 
Definition  
(from 9.3: “Code System”) 
Act  represents the actions 
that are executed and 
must be documented as 
health care is managed 
and provided 
a record of something that is being 
done, has been done, can be done, or is 
intended or requested to be done. 
Participation expresses the context for 
an act in terms such as 
who performed it, for 
whom it was done, where 
it was done, etc. 
indicates that the target of the 
participation is involved in some 
manner in the act, but does not qualify 
how. 
Entity represents the physical 
things and beings that are 
of interest to, and take 
part in health care 
a physical thing, group of physical 
things or an organization capable of 
participating in Acts while in a role. 
Role establishes the roles that 
entities play as they 
participate in health care 
acts 
a competency of the Entity that plays 
the Role as identified, defined, 
guaranteed, or acknowledged by the 
Entity that scopes the Role. 
ActRelationship represents the binding of 
one act to another, such 
as the relationship 
between an order for an 
observation and the 
observation event as it 
occurs 
a directed association between a source 
Act and a target Act. 
 
                                       
1 Thus although HL7 is uncertain in its habit in this respect, we shall for purposes of 
clarity normally capitalize the first letter of HL7 terms such as ‘Act’, ‘ActClass’, 
and so forth. When terms such as ‘entity’, ‘act’, ‘action’, and ‘role’ appear without 
initial capitals in this essay (other than in quotations from HL7 documents), then 
their common meanings are intended. 
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RoleLink  represents relationships 
between individual roles 
a connection between two roles 
expressing a dependency between those 
roles and permitting the authorization or 
nullification of a dependent role based 
on status changes in its causal or 
directing role. The RoleLink may be 
operated over time and thus whose state 
and identity must be managed [sic]. 
Table 1: The Six Backbone Classes of the HL7 Reference Information Model 
 
Unfortunately the RIM’s definition of Act positively undermines a dis-
tinction along these lines by identifying ‘Act’ with ‘Record’ — and this, 
even though the definitions of Entity and Role provided in the same ISO 
document see the latter not as records, but rather as the Entities and 
Roles themselves, thus further consolidating the ‘incoherence’ which we 
identified in the RIM already in 2006 (Smith and Ceusters 2006).1 Third, 
are problems of interpretability, as when the document oscillates — to 
us mysteriously — between the use of ‘act’ and ‘Act’, or ‘role’ and 
‘Role’, sometimes within one and the same sentence.2  
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, is the apparent narrowness of 
scope (in a standard ‘reference information model’ that is intended to 
cover the entire domain of healthcare). The RIM’s list of backbone 
classes is intended to be exhaustive, yet important families of items 
seem be excluded. Above all, where is the place for diseases and for dis-
ease processes inside the patient’s body? Where is the place for hospital-
related adverse events such as falls or spills or leakages of radioactive 
materials? These are not Acts, they are not contexts for Acts, they are 
not Entities, and they are not Roles. Where, then, do they fit within the 
RIM?3 
In what follows we discuss our attempt to make sense of the RIM’s 
backbone classes in terms of what they include, and drawing on HL7’s 
own documentation and usage. We exploit in this connection certain 
fundamental ontological categories distinguished by philosophers in 
                                       
1 See Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters (2006: 133–138). 
2 See for example the definition of ‘Disciplinary action’ as: ‘An action taken with 
respect to a subject Entity by a regulatory or authoritative body with supervisory 
capacity over that entity. The action is taken in response to behavior by the subject 
Entity that body finds to be undesirable.’ 
3 We discuss HL7’s response to this question in Smith and Ceusters (2006), op. cit. 
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dealing with speech acts and similar phenomena, categories which 
reflect, within a systematic, logical framework, the central common-
sensical distinctions such as that between a thing and an event, or be-
tween what is particular and what is general. We believe that any frame-
work of definitions that cannot be cashed out intelligibly in terms of 
such distinctions will not be teachable to, and learnable by, normal hu-
man beings, and thus will likely lead to errors and confusions (and thus 
to the very sorts of inconsistent development which were responsible for 
HL7’s problems of dialect formation).1 
For this purpose we utilize as our instrument of evaluation the Basic 
Formal Ontology (BFO), an upper-level ontology originally developed 
in IFOMIS and now used by many groups of researchers throughout the 
world as a vehicle for promoting interoperability of systems designed for 
handling scientific and many other sorts of data.2 We select BFO as 
framework for our assessment of the RIM because it contains a set of 
categorizations which have been both well-tested from many different 
perspectives and also carefully defined and elucidated from a logical 
point of view.  
5. BFO: Independent Continuant 
We use ‘entity’ (with lower case ‘e’), in what follows, as an ontological 
term of art comprehending all items (objects, things, features, attributes, 
patterns,…) that exist in any way. (HL7’s ‘Entity’ is thus much narrower 
in its extension.) All real-world entities, from the BFO perspective, for 
example all entities of the sort that we encounter in the domain of 
healthcare, fall into one of two exclusive categories of continuant and 
occurrent (Grenon, Smith and Goldberg 2005). 
Continuants are entities which continue to exist through time; they 
preserve their identity from one moment to the next even while under-
going a variety of different sorts of changes. Continuants are divided by 
BFO into the two sub-categories of independent and dependent con-
tinuant, the latter being distinguished by the fact that they depend for 
their existence on the former in the way in which, for example, the tem-
                                       
1 “Are the ISO 21090 Data Types Too Complex?”, http://hl7-watch.blogspot.com/ 
2010/11/are-iso-21090-data-types-too-complex.html, last accessed November 12, 
2012. This is just one example of multiple posts at this site documenting the RIM’s 
unteachability. 
2 http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/, last accessed November 12, 2012. 
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perature or mass of a material body dependence on this material body for 
its existence. 
Typical examples of independent continuants from the healthcare 
domain include human beings, buildings, wheelchairs, scalpels, and pa-
per documents in filing cabinets. Each of these entities continues to exist 
through time even as it undergoes changes, for example, a human being 
will continue to exist, and preserve its identity, even as it grows and ages 
over time. 
The RIM’s Entity seems, at first sight, to be a close analogue to what 
BFO identifies as independent continuants. Entities are described by the 
RIM as ‘physical things and beings that are of interest to, and take part 
in health care’. However, when we examine some of the subtypes of 
Entity in the RIM, as illustrated in Table 2, we find a number of items 
which are not physical in the normal meaning of the word. 
Most blatant is ‘Imaging Modality’, which (in conformity with stan-
dard usage among radiologists) is asserted to be a subclass of ‘Device’.1 
It is, however, defined by the RIM as: ‘Class to contain unique attributes 
of diagnostic imaging equipment’. This is to confuse a piece of equip-
ment with one or more of the attributes of a piece of equipment. This 
confusion may well be compatible with the RIM’s description of Entity 
(see Table 1), if the latter is to be read as having ‘(physical entities) and 
(beings)’ 2  as its intended scope and if we are allowed to include 
attributes as ‘beings’. But it is incompatible with the RIM’s definition of 
‘Entity’, since an attribute of a physical thing is neither a physical thing, 
nor a group of physical things, nor an organization capable of participa-
ting in Acts while in a role. 
Worryingly, this example strongly suggests also that, when HL7’s 
authors are formulating definitions, they have no sure understanding of 
the meaning of the very word ‘definition’. In the case of ‘Organization’ 
we are indeed provided with a statement of necessary and sufficient con-
ditions and thus with a definition of a logically recognizable sort. In the 
case of ‘Imaging Modality’, however, we are provided with something 
like a statement of the reasons why those responsible for introducing a 
term thought it necessary to do so (as if one were to define ‘screw-
                                       
1 http://hl7.org, last accessed November 12, 2012. 
2 As contrasted with ‘physical (attributes and beings)’. 
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driver’, for example, as meaning ‘a term I will need next week when I 
reach the letter “S” in my list’). 
Another problem example in Table 2 is ‘Health Chart Entity’, an im-
mediate subclass of RIM ‘Entity’ that is defined as follows: 
Health Chart Entity =def. A health chart included to serve as a docu-
ment receiving entity in the management of medical records.  
                                       
1 Health informatics: – HL7 version 3 – Reference information model – Release 4 
(Document: ISO/HL7 21731:2011(E)), op. cit. 
Entity =def. A physical thing, group of physical things or an organization capable of 
participating in Acts while in a role. 
Living Subject =def. Anything that essentially has the property of life, in-
dependent of current state (a dead human corpse is still essentially a living 
subject). 
Health Chart Entity =def. A health chart included to serve as a document 
receiving entity in the management of medical records. 
Organization =def. A social or legal structure formed by human beings. 
Group =def. A grouping of resources (personnel, material, or places) to be 
used for scheduling purposes. May be a pool of like-type resources, a team, 
or combination of personnel, material and places. 
Place =def. A physical place or site with its containing structure. May be 
natural or man-made. The geographic position of a place may or may not be 
constant. 
Material = def. Any thing that has extension in space and mass, may be of 
living or non-living origin. 
ManufacturedMaterial =def. An Entity or combination of Entities 
transformed for a particular purpose by a manufacturing process. 
Device =def. A subtype of ManufacturedMaterial used in an 
activity, without being substantially changed through that act-
ivity.  
Certificate Representation =def. A physical artifact that 
stores information about the granting of authorization. 
Imaging Modality =def. Class to contain unique attrib-
utes of diagnostic imaging equipment. 
Table 2: HL7 RIM Entity class and selected subclasses1 
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Because the definition is circular, there is no easy way to understand its 
meaning. Is a Health Chart Entity a person or agency that can ‘receive’ a 
document? If so, then why is it not included as a child of ‘Person or Or-
ganization’. Or does ‘Health Chart Entity’ refer to the document itself? 
If so, then this would bring the implication that such a document is, in 
accordance with the RIM’s definition of ‘Entity’, as a ‘physical thing, 
group of physical things or an organization capable of participating in 
Acts while in a role’. To conceive a document as a physical thing, how-
ever, creates problems in view of the fact that the documents of interest 
to a healthcare organization will in many cases be electronic documents, 
and thus information artifacts (abstract patterns created through special 
processes which may be stored simultaneously on many different de-
vices). As we have argued elsewhere, this is an item of a sort which calls 
for a treatment quite different from that of physical entities, a treatment 
that must distinguish clearly between the device that stores information 
and the information entities that are stored.1 That the RIM does not 
acknowledge this distinction is seen in its treatment of ‘certificate rep-
resentation’, which is defined as ‘A physical artifact that stores informa-
tion about the granting of authorization’ and is asserted at the same time 
to be a subtype of ‘device’, defined as a subtype of material, and thus as 
‘having extension in space and mass’. What is the mass of an e-
certificate granting authorization? 
Further problems are raised by the class ‘living subject’, which is for 
some reason not treated as a child of ‘entity class material’, even though 
the latter is defined by the RIM as ‘Any thing that has extension in space 
and mass, may be of living or non-living origin’. The problems here are 
compounded still further when we are told that ‘a dead human corpse is 
still essentially a living subject’.  
6. BFO: Dependent Continuant and the RIM: RoleClass 
Dependent continuants, in BFO, are the states, properties, qualities, and 
roles of patients, administrators and so forth. The category of dependent 
continuant is particularly important for an understanding of the ontology 
of social reality. Examples of special relevance for us here are the 
mental and normative states to which some actions give rise, including 
                                       
1 http://code.google.com/p/information-artifact-ontology/, last accessed November 
12, 2012. 
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above all the intentions of the participants on the one hand and their 
obligations and claims on the other. The category of dependent con-
tinuants includes also the capacities and skills (counted as dispositions 
in BFO) of healthcare personnel, such as the ability to speak Spanish or 
to perform complex medical procedures; the roles — for example the 
nurse or patient roles — that participants play in actions; and their 
authority to perform given actions in virtue of having these roles. These 
entities are continuants in the sense that, like organisms and molecules, 
they preserve their identity over time. For example, an intention is a 
state; that is, it is something that endures from point of inception to point 
of realization. An entity of this sort is dependent in the sense that it 
requires the support of at least one other entity — its bearer — in order 
to exist. A relation of authority is similarly a dependent continuant, in 
this case of a sort that has a multiplicity of bearers, namely (i) the human 
being who has the authority in question, and (ii) the human being(s) over 
whom this authority is wielded.  
Some dependent continuants are captured in the RIM by the classes 
Role and RoleLink. In the RIM, an Entity which participates in an Act 
must do so in a particular Role. The Role defines the Entity’s compet-
ency (which actions it can perform) and constraints (which actions it 
cannot perform). In some cases, the Role connects the player of the Role 
to those bodies, groups, or agencies that have the power to recognize the 
Role. An example from the RIM is LicensedEntityRole, which is a rela-
tionship in which, for example, a medical authority certifies a medical 
caregiver as being permitted to perform certain activities that fall under 
the jurisdiction of the medical authority in question. The RoleLink class 
defines connections between Roles. Examples include has direct author-
ity over and has indirect authority over. In this way the RIM compre-
hends chains of authority in an organization. While there are some sim-
ilarities between HL7 Roles and BFO dependent continuants, however, 
there are also significant differences, to one of which we now turn. 
From the BFO point of view, the universals represented in an onto-
logy are instantiated by particulars. Universals correspond to the general 
terms (such as ‘cell’ or ‘electron’ or ‘pneumonia’) used in scientific texts 
and also to the even more general terms (such as ‘independent con-
tinuant’ and ‘entity’) used in high-level, domain-neutral ontologies such 
as BFO that have been designed to support the data annotation and 
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cross-domain data integration needs of scientists. Particulars are the 
entities that we can observe, for example in the lab or clinic, or record, 
for example when we register a baby’s weight or a nurse’s promotion.  
Particulars then instantiate corresponding universals (Smith and 
Ceusters 2010). Just as humans, hospitals, kidneys, and so forth, in-
stantiate the universals person, hospital and kidney, so dependent con-
tinuants such as Pippa’s weight, or John’s nurse role, or Mary’s author-
ity over Harvey, instantiate universals such as nurse role and authority, 
respectively. Just as it is common in a healthcare setting to find multiple 
instantiations of the universal human, so it is common to find multiple 
instantiations of the same role. For example, nurse practitioner role is 
multiply instantiated whenever a hospital has more than one nurse 
practitioner; but in each case it is the same role universal that is being 
instantiated. In the case of an authority role, the picture might look like 
this: 
 
 independent continuant dependent continuant 
universal 
organism role 
person authority role 
particular Mary, Harvey Mary’s authority over Harvey 
 
Between Mary and the universal person, and between Mary’s role as 
someone who has this specific authority in this specific healthcare insti-
tution, and the universal authority there obtains the relation of in-
stantiation. Between Mary’s authority and Mary herself there obtains the 
relation of inherence (Mary herself is the bearer of her authority). 
Between person and organism and between nurse role and role there ob-
tains the relation of subsumption (person is a subtype, or sub-universal, 
of organism). 
Can we now identify ‘Role’ in the RIM with what is called ‘role’ in 
BFO? Unfortunately not. Again, the extension of Role has been con-
ceived by the authors of the RIM in a seemingly arbitrary way, with the 
result that it is too ontologically heterogeneous to identify with any class 
of entities that has been coherently defined. Certainly some subclasses of 
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HL7 Role represent dependent continuants in BFO’s sense, as for 
example in cases such as this: 
 
Healthcare An entity (player) that is authorized to provide health care   
provider services by some authorizing agency (scoper). 
 
Patient A Role of LivingSubject (player) as a recipient of health care  
  services from a healthcare provider (scoper). 
 
Health cart The role of material (player) that is the physical health chart   
  belonging to an organization (scoper). 
 
Table 3: Examples of subclasses of HL7 Role1 
 
But there are on the other hand also specializations of Role which have 
nothing to do with roles as commonly conceived. Consider what the 
RIM calls RoleClassOntological, including has generalization, instance 
and subsumed by as subtypes (see Table 4).2 The latter, unfortunately, 
have nothing to do with roles in the commonsensical usage of this term. 
 
RoleClassOntological  A relationship in which the scoping Entity defines or specifies 
what the playing Entity is. Thus, the player's "being" (Greek: 
ontos) is specified. [Description: RoleClassOntological is an 
abstract domain that collects roles in which the playing entity 
is defined or specified by the scoping entity.] 
Subsumed by  Relates a prevailing record of an Entity (scoper) with another 
record (player) that it subsumes. Examples: Show a correct 
new Person object (scoper) that subsumes one or more duplic-
ate Person objects that had accidentally been created for the 
same physical person. Constraints: Both the player and scoper 
must have the same classCode. 
Has 
generalization 
Relates a specialized material concept (player) to its gener-
alization (scoper). 
Instance  An individual piece of material (player) instantiating a class of 
material (scoper). 
                                       
1 Health informatics: – HL7 version 3 – Reference information model – Release 4 
(Document: ISO/HL7 21731:2011(E)), op. cit. 
2 RoleClassOntological is introduced by the RIM as an immediate subclass of Role, 
but in a separate group from Patient, Caregiver, and other roles, alongside 




Specifies the player Entity (the equivalent Entity) as an Entity 
that is considered to be equivalent to a reference Entity 
(scoper). The equivalence is in principle a symmetric relation-
ship, however, it is expected that the scoper is a reference en-
tity which serves as reference entity for multiple different 
equivalent entities. Examples: An innovator’s medicine for-
mulation is the reference for “generics”, i.e., formulations 
manufactured differently but having been proven to be bio-
logically equivalent to the reference medicine. Another ex-
ample is a reference ingredient that serves as basis for quantity 
specifications (basis of strength, e.g., metoprolol succinate 
specified in terms of metoprolol tartrate.)  
Same The “same” role asserts an identity between playing and 
scoping entities, i.e., that they are in fact two records of the 
same entity instance, and, in the case of discrepancies (e.g. dif-
ferent DOB, gender), that one or both are in error. Usage: play-
ing and scoping entities must have same classCode, but need 
not have identical attributes or values. Example: a provider re-
gistry maintains sets of conflicting demographic data for what 
is reported to be the same individual. 
Table 4: The RIM’s RoleClassOntological and examples of its subtypes1 
 
The RIM’s authors have, it would seem, for some reason come to the 
conclusion that it is necessary to add basic ontological terms and rela-
tions (such as ‘kind’, ‘instance’, ‘subsumed by’, and so forth) into the 
framework of the RIM. The recommended approach, in such circum-
stances, would be to adopt the best practices common in the appropriate 
discipline, which is in this case the discipline of ontology. (And, for all 
their differences, there is a great deal of commonality among the three 
most widely used upper-level ontologies — namely BFO, DOLCE and 
SUMO — as concerns basic ontological terms and relations.) Unfortu-
nately, as so often been in the history of HL7, the RIM’s authors chose 
to develop a special, idiosyncratic framework of their own, even though 
this meant sacrificing interoperability with externally developed stan-
dards. Moreover, they chose to do this on the basis of the assumption 
that the terms and relations in question must be subsumed under the 
RIM’s existing six backbone classes.  
                                       
1 Health informatics: – HL7 version 3 – Reference information model – Release 4 
(Document: ISO/HL7 21731:2011(E)), op. cit. 
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The result, we are sorry to say, is an egregious potage of confusion. 
To view subsumed by as a role is analogous to viewing the relation be-
tween, say, the species rabbit and the genus mammal by conceiving the 
latter as a role played by the former. And worse: all of the RIM’s back-
bone classes, and indeed the entire structure of the RIM, require for their 
understanding the prior distinction between particular and universal. It 
does not make sense to conceive this distinction itself — under the 
heading ‘Instance’ — in terms of Roles.  
7. BFO: Occurrent and the RIM ActClass 
Occurrents (also called events or processes) are defined from the BFO 
point of view as being items which are such that they unfold themselves 
in their successive phases. Thus in contrast to continuants, occurrents 
never exist in full in any single instant of time.1 The life of a patient is an 
occurrent, as also is the course or history of a given disease or of a given 
treatment. Actions are occurrents, and so also are sequences of actions, 
from planning, to issuing of orders, to the execution of a plan. (Plans 
themselves however are continuants: thus they endure continuously 
through time until they reach the point of complete execution or aban-
donment.) 
Act represents the closest analogue in the RIM to occurrents, but it is 
at best a weak analogue, since as we have argued elsewhere (see Smith 
and Ceusters 2006), it is defined both too narrowly and too broadly, to a 
degree that gives rise to the hypothesis that (as in the case of ‘Role’) it is 
not capable of being coherently defined. Here we pursue the assumption 
that — in keeping with the conception of the RIM as a ‘model of health-
care information’, rather than of the reality which such information is 
about — Act does not comprehend actions themselves, but rather only 
the records which arise when actions are documented by a healthcare 
professional in either a clinical or an administrative context. These 
records themselves are (for the RIM) Acts. (That such an identification 
brings confusion to the user is revealed most poignantly in the fact that 
the RIM / ISO document referred to above itself contains multiple 
passages, including the definition of Entity quoted in our Table 1, in 
                                       
1 We leave aside here the case of occurrent boundaries, for example beginnings and 
endings. 
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which ‘Act’ is used to mean, not ‘the record of an act’, but rather the act 
itself, in which some Entity participates.) 
To help us to understand the rationale behind the RIM’s design, it is 
useful to point to the view of the medical record on which it is based, a 
view formulated by Rector and Nolan in 1991, according to which the 
medical record is a record, not of what is the case on the side of the 
patient, but rather of ‘what clinicians have said about what they have 
heard, seen, thought and done’ (Rector, Nolan and Kay 1991). From this 
point of view, not faithfulness to the clinical history and care of the 
patient is the fundamental criterion for what gets included in record, but 
rather, as Rector and Nolan express it: 
The first consequence of our view of faithfulness is that the informa-
tion in the medical record itself is not about what was “true” of the 
patient but what was observed and believed by clinicians.1  
Consider the case where physician A documents (at time t and place p) 
that physician B obtains a blood sample from patient C. Whether or not 
physician A actually documented that ‘physician B obtains a blood 
sample from patient C’ is of vital importance to the medical record. 
What is of lesser importance, according to the Rector-Nolan view, is 
whether or not the proposition ‘physician B obtains a blood sample from 
patient C’ is true. The idea is that information about the real world can 
be brought into the medical record only through records — descriptions 
of acts — formulated by suitably authorized persons. Since these de-
scriptions are always attributed to someone, it is possible to have a med-
ical record which contains statements about one and the same real world 
activity which yet disagree in their propositional content (for example 
because their authors were provided with conflicting information). The 
medical record will then still be consistent, for it will contain descrip-
tions not of the form  
physician B obtained a blood sample from patient C 
physician B did not obtain a blood sample from patient C 
but rather of the form  
                                       
1 On the significance of the use of “snear” quotes around the word ‘true’, here, see 
Stove (2011). 
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authorized person A1 recorded: ‘physician B obtained a blood sample 
from patient C’ 
authorized person A2 recorded: ‘physician B did not obtain a blood 
sample from patient C’. 
This means, however, that the extension of the RIM’s Act — meaning 
the totality of acts in reality described through Acts — overlaps only 
partially with that of the BFO category of occurrents. This is because 
Act, for the RIM comprehends not only the records which result from 
documenting processes that have happened, but also counterpart records 
of processes that did not happen, that can happen, are intended to hap-
pen, are requested to happen, and so forth, in reflection of the RIM’s 
distinguished mood codes. Or as HL7 itself formulates the matter: ‘The 
moodCode distinguishes among Acts that are meant as factual records, 
records of intended or ordered services, and other modalities in which 
acts can be recorded.’1 Acts will thus include also, for instance, (records 
of) intended but cancelled surgeries. The fact that there can be Acts, in 
the sense of the RIM, which never happen is from this point of view 
understandable. Unfortunately however this outcome is in conflict with 
the RIM’s own description of Act (see Table 1, again) as representing 
the actions that are executed. 
8. Conclusion 
Our purpose has been to show how the RIM’s backbone classes line up, 
or rather fail to line up, with the fundamental categories of the BFO 
ontology. If BFO, as we believe, comes close to capturing categorical 
distinctions at the heart of common sense, then this failure implies major 
shortcomings in the RIM — shortcomings for example as concerns 
learnability, coherence, comprehensiveness, and stable evolution. As we 
saw, the HL7 has presumed that the problems of dialect formation which 
had plagued v2 would be resolved once the RIM was brought into play. 
On the basis of this presumption the HL7 organization has gone on to 
promulgate manifold varieties of RIM-conformant ‘v3’ standards, and 
these new standard — even in spite of their manifest shortcomings — 
have been incorporated into multiple health information technology 
                                       
1  Health informatics: – HL7 version 3 – Reference information model – Release 4 
(Document: ISO/HL7 21731:2011(E)), http://standardsproposals.bsigroup.com/ 
Home/getPDF/1361, last accessed November 28, 2012. 
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initiatives, where they have sometimes been associated with conspicuous 
failures, some of them on a national scale.1 On the other side, however, 
there are also positive signs which are slowly but surely beginning to 
manifest themselves, and we are pleased to observe that the claims made 
on behalf of the RIM are increasingly being treated with suspicion in 
healthcare informatics circles.2 
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Intentionality and Indexicality: Content Internalism and 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations  
Andrew D. Spear 
1. Introduction1  
A traditional approach to issues of meaning, reference, experience, and 
knowledge is to analyze them in terms of the intentionality of conscious-
ness. On this view intentional events consist of three distinct but correl-
ated components: the intentional act, the intentional content, and the 
intentional object. On such a view, the object that an intentional event is 
about is determined by the intentional act and the intentional content of 
that event. Further, on this view intentional events are characteristically 
conception-dependent, object-independent, and content-indeterminate 
(Smith & McIntyre 1982). ‘Conception-dependence’ means that thought 
about an object is always thought of the object as being a certain way or 
by means of a specific description (e.g. Napoleon as the victor at Jena, a 
triangle as a three-sided geometrical figure). ‘Object-independence’ 
means that it is possible to have meaningful thoughts about objects that 
do not exist (e.g. Pegasus, phlogiston). And ‘content-indeterminacy’ 
means that the way in which a subject thinks about an object rarely, if 
ever, involves a complete description or determination of all features of 
the object (e.g. S’s thinking about the evening star does not guarantee 
that the content of S’s thought also includes that the evening star is the 
morning star or that the evening star is the planet Venus; S may in fact 
not be thinking of or even know these things at all). In addition to gar-
nering support from basic phenomenological observations, the tradi-
tional view of intentionality is also supported and recommended by the 
fact that it can explain a number of traditional puzzles from the philo-
sophy of language and mind, including informative identity statements, 
                                       
1 I first met Ingvar Johansson in Buffalo, NY, but truly became acquainted with him 
during a year at the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science 
at the University of the Saarland in Germany in 2006. Working as colleagues, and 
regularly talking over lunch at the Imbiss Café, I was struck by Ingvar’s wide philo-
sophical knowledge, his seemingly inexhaustible enthusiasm for philosophy, and 
his generosity with his time and comments. I have learned a great deal from Ingvar 
and am honored to contribute to this Festschrift in honor of his seventieth birthday.  
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meaningful thought about non-existent objects, and failure of inter-
substitution in intensional contexts.  
This view of intentionality is a kind of descriptivism and a kind of 
internalism about mental content insofar as it is intentional content that 
determines what object a thought is about by presenting that object as 
being a certain way. This understanding of intentionality is thus com-
mitted to some version of the thesis that intentional content is the 
“sense” of significant thoughts and assertions and that it is this inten-
tional content that determines the referent or extension of the thought, a 
characteristic internalist thesis. It is also plausible to view intentional 
content as determined by internal non-relational features of intentional 
subjects. If content determines reference and for the subject to have a 
certain content is just for her to be in a certain mental state, then it seems 
right to say that the content is determined by the mental states of the 
subject only. Further, on this view it is possible for a subject to have an 
intentional thought whose object does not exist, even though the thought 
has content. In such a case all that could determine the content of the 
thought are internal features of the subject.  
As a kind of content internalism, this view of intentionality is subject 
to the challenges that have been raised in the last half decade by various 
types of content externalism and accounts of direct reference. The prim-
ary arguments against content internalism itself, which have focused on 
natural kind terms, indexicals, and demonstratives, proposes cases where 
it seems clear that two subjects are qualitatively identical regarding the 
psychological states they are in and the intentional contents of their 
thoughts but who, contrary to the principle that content determines refer-
ence, are clearly thinking about or referring to different extensions or 
objects. Such cases are supposed to force the internalist to choose be-
tween the thesis that content determines reference and the thesis that 
content is determined by internal psychological states of the subject. The 
thesis that content determines reference is a central one for descriptivist 
internalism insofar as this just is the explanation of how thought is di-
rected toward objects or extensions. However, rejecting the thesis that 
content is determined by internal features of the subject opens up the 
possibility that external features of the object of thought or of the sub-
ject’s environment play a role in determining what the content of a sub-
ject’s thought is, even when the accessible descriptive content involved 
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in that thought remains constant. But accepting the possibility that the 
content of thought might include non-descriptive external elements 
undermines the explanatory power of the content-object distinction in 
addressing traditional puzzles of meaning and reference. Thus, an in-
ternalist committed to the traditional conception of intentionality has 
reasons to resist giving up either of these commitments.  
In what follows, I will consider the Twin Earth thought experiment of 
Hilary Putnam concerning natural kind terms and similar cases that have 
been proposed by John Perry for indexicals. I will argue that these cases 
function as definitive arguments against content internalism, understood 
in terms of the traditional account of intentionality, only on the assump-
tions that (i) internalism is committed to what I will call a strict Fregean 
interpretation of the content determines reference thesis and (ii) that 
there is no descriptive content associated with demonstrative and in-
dexical thoughts (or at least not enough to establish their reference). I 
will argue that Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations understanding 
of the ontology of intentional content provides a framework within 
which it is possible to defend a content internalism committed to a 
weaker content determines reference principle, and that identifies inten-
tional content associated with indexical and demonstrative thoughts, 
while retaining the explanatory advantages of the content-object distinc-
tion. Such a view is immune to standard externalist objections and re-
tains the explanatory power of traditional theories of intentionality.  
2. The Traditional Conception of Intentionality  
The “traditional conception of intentionality” is a way of thinking about 
mental states, their contents and their objects to be found in the work of 
thinkers such as Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl, as well is in the 
writings of more recent philosophers such as Roderick Chisholm, John 
Searle and Tim Crane (Brentano 1995; Husserl 2000; Crane 2001; 
Chisholm 1981; Searle 1983). The basic idea of intentionality is that 
thought consists of a correlation between mental acts and the objects that 
they are about: it is of the essence of thought and of significant experi-
ence more generally to be about or directed toward an object. While the 
initial statement of the view is simple enough, its further development 
leads to a number of insights, each of which is a point of departure for 
further theorizing about the structure of thought and experience. Three 
features have played a central role in almost all accounts of inten-
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tionality in this tradition: these are that intentionality is (i) “existence-
independent”, (ii) “conception-dependent”, and (iii) that it admits of in-
definiteness in what it represents.1 
Intentional thoughts are existence-independent because they can be 
about objects that do not exist, either in cases of error or in cases where 
the thought simply is about something non-existent (such as phlogiston, 
the present king of France, or a round square). Intentional relations are 
conception-dependent insofar as the mind is, at least phenomenologic-
ally speaking, never simply related to an object per se. Rather it is al-
ways related to an object from a certain perspective or under a certain 
description or way of thinking about that object. In perceiving, the object 
is always perceived from a certain perspective and under a certain con-
ception or description. In thinking, an object is thought of under a cer-
tain conception or in a certain way; one can think of Napoleon as “the 
victor at Jena” or as “the vanquished at Waterloo”, but it does not seem 
that one can think of Napoleon while not thinking of him as being any 
way at all. Finally, intentional presentations can involve indeterminacy 
insofar as they need not, in their content, fully specify all features of the 
object they are about.  Thus, the thought that “John is a doctor” is about 
John with respect to the question of whether or not he is a doctor, while 
leaving open, simply not being about or making a decision one way or 
another with regard to many other features of John, such as his height, 
whether he is married, what kind of person he is, etc. This indetermin-
ateness is often a feature of intentional thought about things such as 
John, but not, of course, a feature of John himself. 
2.1 Existence-Independence  
Viewing intentionality as existence-independent is motivated by the 
“paradox of intentionality”. If intentionality is a normal relation between 
a thought and an object, and the existence of such a relation entails the 
existence of its relata, and some intentional objects do not exist, then it 
seems to follow that some non-existent objects are objects (Crane 2001: 
23). To spell this out more explicitly,  
(i) Intentionality is a relationship between a thought and an object. 
                                       
1 This terminology is taken from Smith & McIntyre (1982: chapter 2), however the 
same distinctions are to be found, using different terminology, in Searle (1983) and 
Crane (2001: chapter 1) among others. 
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(ii) If a relationship exists, then its relata also exist. 
(iii) Some intentional thoughts are about objects that do not exist. 
Since by (i) intentionality involves a relationship between a thought and 
an object, then by (ii) any time an intentional relation exists both a 
thought and an object (its relata) must exist as well. But, by (iii) some 
intentional thoughts are related to objects that do not exist. 
C) Therefore some objects are objects that do not exist.  
While some philosophers have been willing to accept this conclusion 
and to try to incorporate non-existent objects into their ontologies as the 
real relata of intentional relations,1 most have seen the conclusion of this 
argument as paradoxical and have argued that one of the premises needs 
to be rejected or altered. Since it is obvious that some thoughts are about 
things that do not exist and it seems equally clear that the existence of a 
relation (such as “giving birth to”, “striking” or “causing”) does entail 
the existence of its relata, the most straightforward way of resolving the 
paradox is to modify the first assumption in some way; the assumption 
that intentionality is always a relationship between thought and an 
object. Once this is done it is possible to either view intentional states 
“adverbially” (when John thinks about Pegasus he is “thinking 
Pegasusly” just as when John experiences green he is “seeing greenly”, 
etc.) or to maintain that intentional states are relations to something other 
than their objects. For example, Frege views intentional relations as ob-
taining between a thought and an abstract sense, thus for him the obtain-
ing of this relationship does not require the existence of a corresponding 
object in all cases (Frege 1948). What these moves have in common is 
that they involve making a distinction between the content (or sense or 
adverbial mode) and the object of an intentional thought, so affirming 
                                       
1 The most notorious example being Meinong (1960). For a general discussion of 
non-existent objects, see It is worth noting that, whereas Meinong was willing to 
accept the conclusion of this argument, Frege modified premise one, effectively 
replacing ‘object’ with Sinn or sense, while Russell in “On Denoting” retains 
premises one and two and avoids the Meinongian conclusion by denying three, 
effectively maintaining that there are no meaningful thoughts about non-existent ob-
jects (thoughts that seem to be about such objects, e.g. “the present King of France”, 
are really about something else, namely the complex relations amongst quantified 
groups of objects and properties referred to by definite descriptions) (Frege 1948; 
Russell 1905).  
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the view that intentional states are independent of the existence of the 
objects they are about. 
2.2 Conception-Dependence  
The conception-dependence of intentionality is supported by a number 
of factors. First, phenomenological observation reveals that perception is 
perspectival. When one intends an object perceptually one always ex-
periences it from a particular perspective or vantage point. Thought 
about objects seems the same way: one does not simply think about an 
object, one thinks about it as some kind of object or as determined in a 
certain way or in relation to some other object or objects. Perceptions 
and thoughts don’t just present the world, they present it as being a cer-
tain way. 
In addition to phenomenological data, there are the traditional puzzles 
of informative identity statements (“Hesperus is Phosphorus”) and of the 
failure of intersubstitutability salva veritate in intensional contexts (e.g., 
Lois believes that Superman, but not Clark Kent, can fly). The fact that a 
subject can know something about an individual described in one way, 
but fail to know about the same individual when the individual is de-
scribed in another way, strongly suggests that thought about objects is 
conception-dependent in the way under consideration here: thought 
about an object is always thought about an object as something or in a 
particular respect. 
2.3 Indefiniteness and Indeterminateness  
Finally, the indefiniteness or indeterminateness of intentionality is the 
flipside of the conception-dependence of intentionality. If every thought 
about an object is a thought about that object under a certain mode of 
presentation, then any given thought about an object will determine 
some things about that object, present it as being a certain way, while 
leaving others open and undetermined. What is determined is definite 
and rules out some other ways of thinking about the object, but what is 
indeterminate leaves open and even positively suggests certain possibili-
ties of future determination of the object in thought or experience.  
Some thoughts will be indefinite in the sense that they do not even 
specify a particular object that they are about (for example, the desire for 
a glass of water is, usually, not a desire for any particular glass of water, 
and for most of us, a thought about “the world’s tallest woman” is not a 
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thought about any particular person), but even thoughts that are about a 
specific object under a specific conception will still be indeterminate 
with regard to a large number of the object’s qualities. (E.g. to think of 
Napoleon as “the victor at Jena” is to determine that he is a human 
being, a military leader of some sort and, with respect to this particular 
battle, the victor; but thinking this thought does not, by itself, determine 
anything about the question of Napoleon’s other qualities, such as his 
appearance or height, or how he faired in other military endeavors, such 
as Waterloo.) Thus, on the traditional conception of intentionality, the 
complete identity of the object of thought is more than or more finely in-
dividuated than the content of any given thought about that object 
presents it as on a given occasion. 
2.4 The Act-Content-Object Structure of Intentionality 
In light of the foregoing, intentional events can be analyzed in terms of 
four components: a cognitive subject, the act of intending itself, the 
object that is intended, and the content or way in which the object that is 
intended is thought about by the subject. Thus, every intentional event 
involves a subject presenting to herself or directing herself toward an 
object in a certain kind of way and by means of a conception or way of 
thinking about that object.1 If Joan perceives the top of a box, then Joan 
is the subject of the intention, perceiving is the particular kind of act of 
intending she is engaging in, a “box viewed-from-the-top” is the content 
or way in which she perceives and recognizes the object, and the object 
of her intention itself is the entire three dimensional physical object that 
is the box. This yields the following schema for intentional events, inten-
tional: Subject à Act à Content à Object.2 I will be assuming this 
structure and using this terminology in what follows.  
                                       
1 The use of ‘intention’ here has no special connection with the idea of an agent 
‘intending’ to do something or with intentional action. As it is used here, ‘intention’ 
indicates, roughly, what many philosophers today refer to as propositional attitudes.  
2 Searle uses “psychological mode” for intentional act, and “representational con-
tent” for intentional content (Searle 1983), while Tim Crane speaks of “intentional 
mode” and “intentional content” (Crane 2001) and, in the Logical Investigations 
(Husserl 2000) Husserl used “act-quality” for intentional act and “act-matter” for 
intentional content, while later in Ideas (Husserl 1982) he used “noesis” and “no-
ema” for these two notions respectively.  For discussion of this terminology and its 
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For my purposes here the subject of intentional events will not receive 
much attention. What will be more important is that there are systematic 
correlations between intentional acts, intentional contents and inten-
tional objects: it is possible for different acts to have the same content (it 
is possible to perceive a red apple, to wish for one, to remember one, 
etc.), and for different contents to be directed toward or about the same 
object (as in the case of the box used as an example above, it is possible 
to perceive it first from one side, then from another; it is also possible to 
think of, say, Napoleon as “the victor at Jena” or as “the vanquished at 
Waterloo”, or the number 2 first as “even” and then as “the successor of 
1”).  
2.5 The Content-Object Distinction: Contents as Quasi-Descriptive 
Senses  
The distinction between the content and the object of thought is of fun-
damental importance for the theory of intentionality. The content of a 
thought is the specific way in which a given intentional event presents 
some object as being and plays the role of directing the mind of the sub-
ject towards that object. On the view under consideration here, inten-
tional contents are understood as quasi-descriptive senses,1 similar in 
function to the Fregean notion of Sinn (Frege 1948). This way of 
viewing intentional content is arguably also part of Husserl’s conception 
of intentionality, and has been endorsed by David Woodruff Smith and 
Ronald McIntyre, as well as by John Searle in his notion of the “con-
ditions of satisfaction” for intentional content (Smith and McIntyre 
1982: 206; Searle 1983). To say that intentional contents are quasi-
descriptive senses is to say that they have something like truth-
conditions. Intentional contents present the world as being a certain way, 
and it is thus in virtue of their contents that they are about or directed to 
what they are about while it will be in virtue of the way the world is that 
such thoughts will succeed in referring to an object, or in being true or 
false with regard to one. In other words, thought contents mean or “say” 
that the world is a certain way, while the objects and states of affairs in 
                                                                                                                    
development in Husserl, see Smith and McIntyre (1982: chapter 3) and Simons 
(1995).  
1 I say “quasi-descriptive sense” here because, as I will explain below, the sense in-
volved in intentional content as I am using it here need not be or involve explicitly 
linguistic expressions or content. 
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the world determine whether or not what these contents “say” or mean is 
indeed satisfied by or accurate of the world. 
3. The Traditional Conception of Intentionality as Descriptivist and 
so Internalist about Mental Content  
The traditional conception of intentionality is, arguably, a version of 
content internalism, though it is difficult to pronounce on the issue de-
finitively, since this way of thinking about the mind historically predates 
discussions of internalism and externalism about mental content. In “The 
Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, Hilary Putnam characterizes the traditional un-
derstanding of meaning as committed to two theses:  
(I) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a 
certain psychological state.  
(II) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of “intension”) deter-
mines its extension (in the sense that sameness of intension en-
tails sameness of extension). (Putnam 1975: 136) 
For Putnam, the significance of (I) is ultimately that it implies that 
“…the psychological state of the speaker determines the intension (and 
hence, by assumption (II), the extension)” of a term (1975: 139). Now, if 
‘meaning’ and ‘intension’ are replaced with ‘content’, as many philo-
sophers have felt free to do, then the traditional account of content is, 
according to Putnam, committed to the thesis that (I) the content of a 
thought is determined only by the psychological states of the subject of 
that thought and (II) the content of a thought determines the referent or 
extension of that thought, what it is about. The view of intentionality 
under discussion here is plausibly a version of the traditional account of 
content as Putnam understands this. 
The traditional conception of intentionality is most clearly committed 
to some version of descriptivism, the view that a subject succeeds in 
thinking about or referring to something in virtue of possessing descript-
ive information of some sort that is adequate to pick out the object or 
extension apart from all others.1 Intentional content is a kind of descript-
                                       
1 As Husserl writes, “The matter [intentional content] must be that element in an act 
which first gives it reference to an object, and reference so wholly definite that it 
not merely fixes the object meant in a general way, but also the precise way in 
which it is meant…It is the act’s matter that makes its object count as this object 
and no other…” (italics in the original)(Husserl 2000: 589). 
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ive content, even if the descriptions or representations that it involves 
will not always be linguistic. There are a number of motivations for this 
descriptivism. First, positing intentional contents consisting of descript-
ive information is a way of beginning to answer the basic question of 
why some things in nature are intentional, have thoughts and beliefs that 
are about other things, while others are not. Merely causal and physical 
relations are pervasive in nature, both among beings that are and beings 
that are not intentional, so positing a distinctive component of thought, 
its involving descriptively structured intentional content, begins to 
explain the difference between intentional and non-intentional beings. 
Second, as already noted, there is phenomenological evidence for de-
scriptivism. When objects are perceived or thought about, this per-
ceiving and thinking is in fact accompanied by some descriptive in-
formation, some mode of presentation or other. Third, it seems that in 
order for a subject to be thinking about an object, she must have some 
understanding of what it is that she is thinking about. It seems im-
plausible to say that S is thinking about O, but has no conception what-
soever of what O is in virtue of which she picks it out from other pos-
sible objects of thought. Suggesting that S thinks of objects in virtue of 
possessing identifying descriptive information about them avoids this 
implausibility. Fourth, and also noted above, distinguishing between 
descriptively structured intentional content on the one hand and the 
object of thought on the other makes it possible to provide unified 
responses to traditional puzzles of meaning and reference, such as the 
puzzle of informative identity statements. As a version of descriptivism, 
the traditional conception of intentionality is thus committed to some 
version of Putnam’s (II), which I will characterize here as:  
Content Determines Reference (CDR): The content of a thought deter-
mines the referent or extension of that thought, what it is about. 
What about Putnam’s first thesis, that the content of a thought is deter-
mined by the psychological states of the subject of that thought only? To 
say that the content of a thought is determined by psychological states of 
the subject is to say that where content is internal, two subjects who are 
internal mental duplicates, having all historical and current mental prop-
erties and experiences in common, will also be content-duplicates, they 
will be instantiating qualitatively identical mental contents.   
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The idea that content is entirely determined by the psychological 
states of cognitive subjects does seem to be a commitment of the tradi-
tional conception of intentionality, albeit a less direct one than CDR. 
Accepting it is motivated both by the existence-independence of inten-
tionality and by its conception-dependence. If it is possible for a subject 
to have a thought (act and content) where the object of that thought fails 
to exist, then it seems clear that that thought must supervene on the 
intrinsic features of the subject; what else could it depend on for its 
existence? The conception-dependence of intentionality also motivates 
commitment to content internalism insofar as it suggests that the mode 
or way in which a subject is directed towards the object of thought 
depends on that subject. Further, it seems to be the case (as in illusions 
or hallucinations of perception) that two intentional acts could have 
qualitatively identical content, even though the object of one of these 
acts fails to exist. If this is correct, then it seems that the contents of such 
thoughts depend on the psychological states of the subject alone (since 
in the hallucinatory case there is nothing else for the content to depend 
on). Thus, the traditional conception of intentionality seems committed 
to:  
Psychological States Determine Content (PSdC): The content of a 
subject’s thought is determined by the psychological states of the 
subject only.  
The traditional conception of intentionality, being committed to CDR 
and PSdC, is clearly committed to versions of the theses about meaning 
that Putnam ascribes to traditional views of meaning, and so will also be 
susceptible to Twin Earth and other thought experiments meant to show 
the incompatibility of these theses, and so the falsity of this traditional 
internalist view. In the following section I will consider some of the 
most prominent examples of these challenges and identify certain com-
mon assumptions about content internalism that they make. 
4. Externalism as a Challenge to the Traditional Conception of 
Intentionality  
Recently, it has been argued by many that the conjunction of the two 
commitments of content internalism just discussed, the content deter-
mines reference principle and the thesis that psychological states deter-
mine content, have been decisively refuted, and that this motivates com-
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mitment to externalist views of content according to which the content 
of a thought is determined by at least some factors other than the psy-
chological states of the subject whose thought it is. In what follows my 
goal is to show how the traditional view of intentionality is, in fact, able 
to accommodate the challenges posed by Twin Earth and other anti-
internalist arguments.  
The basic structure of anti-internalist arguments is to propose situ-
ations in which two subjects are internally identical and so identical with 
respect to the contents of their thoughts, but where it seems intuitively 
clear that the reference or aboutness of the subjects’ thoughts is distinct, 
thus they are using the same internalist content to refer to or think about 
different objects. If this is right, then either the content determines refer-
ence principle or the psychological states determine content principle 
must be abandoned. What is most important about these externalist 
scenarios, what gives them their force against internalism, is that the 
subjects described in these scenarios seem to be clearly indistinguishable 
with regard to the descriptive content, broadly interpreted, that is avail-
able to them. What the scenarios seem to show is that the descriptive 
contents that subjects have available are simply not sufficient to explain 
why the subject’s thoughts are about what they are about.  
Now, while such cases are indeed a challenge to traditional intern-
alism, I will argue that what they really draw attention to is the way in 
which features of context can play a role in determining what a subject is 
thinking about at a given time. For example, what the thought “I am here 
now” refers to will depend on who speaks it, where, and when. The 
internalist is committed to saying that there is a quasi-descriptive content 
grasped by subjects who think this thought, but must at the same time 
accommodate the fact that the referents of the thought will be different 
on different occasions. To do this, the internalist must do two things. 
First, articulate a version of the content determines reference principle 
that leaves open the possibility that type-identical mental content tokens 
may, in different contexts, refer to or be about different objects. Second, 
provide an explanation of the descriptive content or “conditions of 
satisfaction” involved in such contents that makes context-sensitivity 
possible (Searle 1983: chapter 8).  
In what follows I will focus on Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth argument 
and John Perry’s discussion of cases involving indexicals and show how 
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each of these anti-internalist arguments rests on a certain reading of the 
content determines reference principle and on a seeming inability of con-
tent internalism to make sense of indexical and demonstrative contents. 
However, it is my position that most if not all of the other anti-internalist 
arguments admit of analyses along the same lines as the ones that I will 
provide here.1 
4.1 The Externalist Challenge and the Need for an Internalist 
Account of Indexicality 
The basic argument of Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment 
is that if (i) content determines reference and (ii) content is determined 
by psychological states of the subject only, then two psychologically 
identical subjects thinking the same thought in different contexts should 
be referring to exactly the same thing or extension regardless of the 
difference in context. Since it is possible to generate cases of psycho-
logically identical subjects thinking the (descriptively) same thought in 
different contexts where, due to features of the context itself, they seem 
clearly to be referring to different objects or extensions (H2O and XYZ 
respectively in Putnam’s thought experiment), one of the two principles 
must, Putnam argues, be rejected. Here is a more thorough formulation 
of Putnam’s Twin Earth argument:  
                                       
1 The exception to this, it could be argued, is Burge’s “social anti-individualism”, 
the locus classicus for which is Burge (1979). Burge’s argument that the content of 
individuals’ thoughts involving terms such as ‘arthritis’ can be externally individu-
ated by the meaning for such terms that is accepted in their linguistic community 
(such that two individuals using the same term with the same internal ‘content’ 
nevertheless mean or refer to different objects or extensions in virtue of being 
situated in different linguistic communities) is more complicated than standard anti-
internalist arguments insofar as it relies on a discussion of concept possession and 
partial concept possession. My own position is that how one interprets Burge’s ar-
guments for social anti-individualism will depend more or less directly on whether 
one takes the more basic kinds of Twin Earth style arguments themselves to be con-
clusive. If they are, then Burge’s argument for the social case is a natural extension, 
while if they are not (as for internalist sympathizers such as myself), then something 
like Searle’s account of “parasitic intentionality” will be the natural response, see 
Searle (1983: 250). At any rate, I will not be pursuing this kind of anti-internalist 
argument at any length here. Thus I note the omission.  
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(i) Content Determines Reference: Assume that (a) content deter-
mines reference to at most one object or extension and (b) content 
is determined by the subject’s psychological states. 
(ii) Possibility of Internal Duplicates: It is possible for there to be 
internal mental and physical duplicates. Individuals who are 
qualitatively identical with respect to all of their intrinsic prop-
erties, including their psychological states.   
(iii) Logic: If (i) and (ii) then any two internal duplicates will be 
thinking about/referring to exactly the same objects at any time at 
which they have identical psychological states. 
(iv) The Twin Earth Intuition: But Earth individual and Twin Earth 
individual are internally identical agents who, by hypothesis, 
have internally identical thoughts and are yet thinking about/ 
referring to different objects (the extensions containing H2O and 
XYZ respectively). 
C) Therefore, by modus tollens, (i) is false and either (a) or (b) must be 
rejected.  
Putnam takes the balance of his argument to show that it is best to re-
ject (b), the principle that psychological states determine content, though 
he admits that doing this renders the import of the content determines 
reference principle “vacuous” as well (Putnam 1975: 165). The upshot is 
that external features, usually of the subject’s environment, must play 
some role in determining content and, ultimately, in establishing refer-
ence or aboutness as well.  
Now, Putnam’s argument relies essentially on the way in which sub-
jects can use demonstrative thought and pointing in a context to secure 
reference to something, even when they know very little about the nature 
of that thing. This can be seen by considering how one standard in-
ternalist line of response to Twin Earth fails to succeed. This line of re-
sponse is to simply maintain that, so long as the two subjects are really 
internally identical, the extensions of their thoughts includes both XYZ 
and H2O. After all, for all these subjects know prior to the discovery of 
the microstructure of water, the comprehensive descriptions that they as-
sociate with ‘water’ are equally true of both H2O and XYZ, even if they 
have never come into contact with one of these two substances.  
What makes this line of response difficult for the internalist to main-
tain is Putnam’s emphasis on the idea that ‘water’ and other natural kind 
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terms are generally introduced ostensively, by pointing to the surface 
features of a particular stuff in one’s environment and committing to 
thought and reference about the yet undiscovered microstructure of that 
very stuff, whatever it is. As Putnam writes,  
My “ostensive definition’ of water has the following empirical pre-
supposition that the body of liquid I am pointing to bears a certain 
sameness relation (say, x is the same liquid as y, or x is the same as y) 
to most of the stuff I and other speakers in my linguistic community 
have on other occasions called “water”. (Putnam 1975: 141) 
This way of viewing how natural kind terms get their meaning makes 
the internalist line of response just mentioned much more difficult to 
maintain. For any natural kind term that gets its meaning in this way 
(and it can’t be denied that there simply aren’t any), it will be possible to 
propose a mental duplicate in a qualitatively identical environment 
whose act of ostensive definition for that kind term clearly picks out 
something with a different microstructure. Hence the Twin Earth objec-
tion to internalism will survive any internalist attempt to argue that con-
tent determines reference to both Earth and Twin Earth water because it 
can always be insisted that some, perhaps even most, kind terms get 
their meanings in this ostensive way. Putnam himself is very clear about 
this ‘indexical’ component in natural kind terms (Putnam 1975: 153). 
While natural kind terms do not function just like indexicals, insofar as it 
seems unlikely that their extensions remain sensitive to context once 
their reference has been initially fixed, it remains the case that the differ-
ence in the extension of the contents associated with ‘water’ for Earth 
and Twin Earth subjects is to be explained by the fact that the reference 
of this term has been fixed demonstratively to paradigm instances of 
water that differ dramatically in underlying microstructure.  
What the Twin Earth argument shows is thus that demonstrative refer-
ence in a context can make a difference to what an individual succeeds 
in referring to or fixing reference to. So long as it is possible to provide a 
cogent internalist account of the demonstrative reference fixing of mean-
ing for natural kind terms, there is no reason why an internalist could not 
appeal to these differences in the fixing of the reference of the terms to 
explain the difference in content between Earth and Twin Earth subjects. 
When Earth subjects use ‘water’, the content they associate with it is that 
it is anything relevantly similar in underlying microstructure to the stuff 
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with respect to which the reference of the term was originally fixed. 
Since this stuff will be different for Earth and Twin Earth subjects, it 
should be no surprise if their later intentions to refer to “anything 
relevantly similar to that very stuff”, while internally the same, yet refer 
to different extensions, even if these subjects do not know this fact 
(internalism is definitely not the thesis that subjects are omniscient about 
the objects that their thoughts refer to). Everything depends on the de-
monstrative.  
4.2 John Perry on Indexicals  
A similar point can, not surprisingly, be made with regard to two of John 
Perry’s arguments involving indexicals. The first argument is similar in 
structure to Putnam’s Twin Earth argument. Perry proposes Hume and 
his Twin Earth doppelganger Heimson, who both believe the proposition 
“I am David Hume” (Perry 1977: 487–90). If (as the traditional Fregean 
view seems to hold) sense determines reference regardless of context 
and understanding a sense amounts to being in a psychological state, 
then since the two individuals are doppelgangers and so type-identical, 
they will presumably express the same proposition when they respect-
ively utter tokens of the sentence ‘I am David Hume’. But, argues Perry, 
the truth-values of what is said in the two cases, as well of course as 
what the expression ‘I’ refers to, are clearly different. Since the descript-
ive contents of Hume and Heimson’s thoughts are the same, but the 
referents are different, it must be something more than internal states or 
descriptive content that determines reference in these cases.  
Similar to the Twin Earth argument, what Perry’s Hume-Heimson 
case shows is that indexical thought in a context can make a difference 
to what an individual succeeds in referring to, even if most or all of that 
individual’s internal mental content is descriptively the same. The chal-
lenge for the internalist is to provide a plausible internalist account of 
indexical thought content, one that explains how indexical thoughts have 
conditions of satisfaction that establish reference to different things in 
different contexts. 
Perry’s second argument is for the essentiality of indexical statements 
(Perry 1979). Perry maintains that, whatever the meaning of indexicals 
such as ‘I’ are, sentences containing them cannot simply be paraphrased 
by sentences containing purely descriptive non-indexical terms. For 
example, ‘I am writing a letter’ cannot be paraphrased as ‘John Smith is 
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writing a letter on May 5, 2008 and etc.’ without loss or alteration of 
some content. To show this, Perry relies on the reasonable premise that 
belief plays a role in determining action, and then develops scenarios in 
which belief in an indexical sentence plays a role in motivating an 
individual to take action, whereas belief by that same individual in a 
descriptive non-indexical paraphrase of the same sentence does not play 
the same role in motivating the individual to take action unless she also 
possesses the original indexical belief. To illustrate this, Perry tells a 
story about himself at the grocery store. He is following a trail of sugar 
through the isles, trying to find the person who has a broken bag of sugar 
in their cart so he can let them know. Eventually, he looks down and 
realizes that the broken bag of sugar is in his own cart, which leads him 
to adjust it so that it will stop making a mess. The moral to be drawn 
from this story, according to Perry, is that the belief that “someone is 
making a mess” and even the belief that “John Perry is making a mess” 
would not be sufficient by themselves to motivate an individual to take 
action unless that individual also believed that “I am the person making 
a mess” or that “I am John Perry”. This suggests that there is a dimen-
sion of content for indexicals such as ‘I’ that cannot be entirely captured 
by sentences involving only non-indexical terms.  Why is this a problem 
for content internalism?  
The content internalist is committed to a termàcontentàobject 
model. Terms and sentences have their significance in virtue of being as-
sociated with an intentional content, which in turn determines the object 
or extension they are about. Thus a word, such as ‘water’ expresses a 
meaning or sense “the wet stuff, H20, etc.”, which determines reference 
to an extension, construed as all of the particular stuff of which the 
descriptive elements of the sense are true. However, this view in con-
junction with the content determines reference principle raises a problem 
for indexicals. For if an indexical such as ‘I’ does indeed express a 
sense, the question is “what is it”? One traditional answer has been to 
say that the meaning or sense of ‘I’ is “the very person who is speaking”. 
Thus, indexicals get glossed as expressing non-indexical third person 
descriptions and sentences containing indexicals are taken to tacitly 
express neutral third-person propositions where the indexicals are 
replaced with proper names (for ‘I’, ‘you’), specific dates (for ‘now’, 
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‘yesterday’), locations (for ‘here’, ‘there’) and etc.1 Sentences containing 
indexicals thus have a different meaning, express a different content, on 
each occasion of their use, and so preserve the spirit of the strong sense 
determines reference principle. But it is precisely this move that Perry’s 
argument for the essentiality of indexicals blocks.   
Perry’s argument shows that there is a component of sense for in-
dexical expressions that is lost when the indexicals in such expressions 
are paraphrased away in favor of third-person descriptive content. Now, 
once again, this does indeed raise a problem for an internalist committed 
to the content determines reference principle, for such an internalist must 
try to explain how the senses or contents involved on different occasions 
of indexical use are indeed different insofar as each succeeds in referring 
to a different thing, but this difference cannot, it seems, be a difference 
in the descriptive content associated with different occasions of use. 
4.2 Singular Thoughts and Demonstrative Reference 
Finally, it is possible to offer relatively straightforward anti-internalist 
arguments involving demonstratives. Summarizing arguments of this 
kind, Jessica Brown (2004: 13–15) proposes a case of two internal du-
plicates each of whom is having the qualitatively identical experience of 
an apple before her, but where the apples are non-identical in the two 
cases. In a case such as this, the perceptual contents (and so the contents 
of any demonstrative reference based on them) seem to be clearly ident-
ical, but the referents in the two cases are just as obviously different. The 
content determines reference principle is once again challenged, so 
internalism seems to fail for demonstrative contents as well. 
4.4 Content Determines Reference & Indexical and Demonstrative 
Content  
A major supposition of anti-internalist arguments is that the content 
determines reference principle is a strict one:  
                                       
1 An example of this sort of response to the problems posed by indexicals can be 
found in the final chapter of Cohen and Nagel (1993).  
 592 
Strict Content Determines Reference (SCDR): content determines re-
ference and each content determines at most one referent or exten-
sion.1 
This supposition is fair, historically speaking, as Frege himself was 
clearly committed to it. According to Frege, the meanings of linguistic 
terms are senses, which are abstract particulars. It is the sense or thought 
expressed by a linguistic expression that determines what, if anything, it 
refers to, and since senses are abstract particulars, each sense is only able 
to establish reference to (at most) one object or extension. This model 
works well for many kinds of terms, especially the more abstract terms 
of mathematics, logic, and the sciences, and can also be applied to 
proper names. However, this account runs into trouble with indexicals 
and demonstratives.  
The reason is that the content of such expressions seems to have two 
parts. On the one hand, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘this’ surely have some 
common core of meaning or rule of use that is constant from one usage 
to another. The word ‘I’ does not have a completely different meaning 
for John and Dan when each of them utters ‘I am hungry’, even if it does 
have a different referent. But the common meaning associated with in-
dexicals is not by itself sufficient to establish what they refer to on a 
given occasion. If the common sense or meaning of indexicals was all 
that was involved in establishing their reference, then by the principle 
that meaning determines reference, they should always refer to the same 
thing. But, of course, they don’t. So it seems that there must be some 
additional “completing sense”, different for each occasion of use of an 
indexical, which makes it possible for the subject’s thought to succeed in 
referring to, e.g., her current location apart from all others. Further, this 
“completing sense” cannot consist merely of third person descriptions of 
the subject’s current location, for due to the points raised by Perry about 
the essential nature of indexicals, thinking that “it is hot in the capital of 
Italy” is not the same as thinking “it is hot here” unless one is also aware 
that “here is the capital of Italy”, which reintroduces the indexical and so 
the problem of providing a “completing” indexical sense for the subject 
to grasp. But now it begins to look like, for each occasion of the use of 
                                       
1 ‘At most’ because it is possible, as already noted, to have contents without refer-
ents. E.g. phlogiston.  
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an indexical (or at least for each person, place, time, etc.) there must (i) 
be a distinct completing sense that establishes the referent of the in-
dexical on that occasion, but (ii) these completing senses cannot be com-
posed entirely of neutral third person descriptions, for if they were then 
they would still not, in light of Perry’s discussion of the essentiality of 
indexicals, capture the full meaning of indexical expressions, so these 
senses must involve an indescribable (in any words other than the appro-
priate indexicals) component that can only be thought by the appropriate 
subject or at the appropriate time or in the appropriate place for each 
distinct indexical completing sense. But, understood in this way, com-
mitment to the existence of a very large number of partially inexpress-
ible abstract indexical senses seems implausible.  
To accommodate the case of indexicals (and demonstratives) what and 
the internalist needs to do is provide a different view of the metaphysics 
of intentional content (one that does not appeal to abstract Fregean 
senses) that allows for the articulation of a version of the content deter-
mines reference principle that leaves open the possibility that type-
identical mental content tokens may, in different contexts, refer to or be 
about different objects. Doing this will make it possible to provide an 
explanation of the descriptive content or “conditions of satisfaction” 
involved in indexical and demonstrative contents that is the same on 
different occasions of use, but that nevertheless due to its context sensit-
ivity and its being actually instantiated in a particular context, refers to 
different objects on different occasions. Significantly, the view of the 
metaphysics of intentional content and the partial account of indexicals 
offered by Edmund Husserl in the Logical Investigations holds out the 
promise of doing both of these things.  
5. Husserl’s LI View of Intentionality as a Version of the Traditional 
Conception that Can Survive the Challenges of Externalism  
In the Logical Investigations Husserl developed a view according to 
which conscious acts are primarily intentional, and a mental act is inten-
tional just in case it has an act-quality, an act-matter and an act-charac-
ter. The quality of an act is the kind of act that it is, whether perceiving, 
imagining, judging, wishing, etc. The matter of an act is what I have 
been calling its content, it is the mode or way in which an object is 
thought about, e.g. a house intended from one perspective rather than 
another, or Napoleon thought of first as “the victor at Jena”, then as “the 
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vanquished at Waterloo”. The character of an act includes such things as 
whether it is an act of merely reflecting on a possibility (a “non-positing 
act”) or one of judging or asserting that something is the case (a 
“positing act”), as well as the degree of evidence that is available to sup-
port the intention of the act as fulfilled or unfulfilled (as genuinely 
presenting some object in just the way that the act-matter suggests, or 
not). The notion of act-character is important for purposes of epistemo-
logy, but here I will abstract from it in order to focus, primarily, on 
Husserl’s notion of content or act-matter.1 
Husserl’s notion of content as act-matter is different from the standard 
Fregean notion discussed above. Whereas the standard Fregean view 
sees the sense of a thought as an abstract particular that the thought must 
somehow grasp, Husserl views act-quality, act-matter and act-character 
as mutually dependent constituents of a concrete particular thought it-
self. Just as there cannot be color without saturation, brightness and hue, 
so for Husserl there cannot be an intentional act without quality, matter 
and character. The act-matter or content of an act, according to the early 
Husserl, is a real dependent part of the intentional act itself rather than 
an abstract particular of some sort that the act must reach out and grasp. 
Thus, on Husserl’s view it is less mysterious how a subject has access to 
the sense or content of her intentional state insofar as the act-matter is a 
literal constituent of that state itself. 
Whereas Fregean accounts deal with the fact that one individual can 
have the same thought at different times and different individuals can 
think about the same thing at any time by positing a single abstract sense 
that is the numerically identical content of all of their thoughts, Husserl 
views particular act-matters or contents as instances of ideal act-content 
species. Thus, on Husserl’s view, two subjects are able to think about the 
same thing in the same way when both of them instantiate exactly 
similar instances of a single kind of content or act-matter. Thus if John 
                                       
1 Husserl’s own development of this view occurs in Husserl (2002: Investigations I 
[for discussion of meaning and reference], V [for the structure of intentionality 
itself], & VI [for the discussion of the epistemological implications of the previ-
ously developed views]). One of the most sustained discussions of the metaphysics 
of meanings as intentional contents that is my focus here is in Logical Investigation 
I, Chapter Four (Husserl 2000: 328–333). A helpful overview of Husserl’s views is 
Simons (1995).  
 595 
and Sarah are both thinking about how they would like to see the Twins 
win the 2008 World Series in baseball, they are having the same thought 
and thinking about the same objects in virtue of instantiating exactly 
similar act-matters of the single act-matter type “the Twins win the 2008 
World series in baseball” (the hoping that this comes about would fall 
under act-quality rather than act-matter). On this view of intentional 
content, it is not the abstract content species or types, but rather specific 
instantiations of them in the thoughts of intentional subjects that deter-
mine reference. While this fact may make little difference for abstract 
thoughts in mathematics, logic, and well-developed areas of science, it 
will make a great deal of difference for cases where the intentional 
content itself might involve context sensitive indexical or demonstrative 
elements. This suggests a modification of the content determines refer-
ence principle as follows:  
Logical Investigations Content Determines Reference (LICDR): The 
instantiation of a content-type in a thought determines the referent or 
extension of that thought, what it is about. 
If it is possible to provide an account of the descriptive information or 
“conditions of satisfaction” for indexical and demonstrative contents 
such that different instantiations of the same “content-species” would 
refer, as required, to different objects in different contexts of use, then 
the traditional theory of intentionality understood as committed to some-
thing like LICDR will not be affected by Twin Earth style anti-
internalist arguments. In light of the arguments considered so far, espe-
cially those of John Perry, is such an account possible?  
5.1 A Basic Internalist Account of Indexical Thought 
It is well recognized by those who wish to defend internalism about con-
tent in the context of an account of the intentionality of the mind that (i) 
the main issue is that of providing an adequate account of indexical and 
demonstrative thought, and that (ii) doing this involves modifying the 
strict principle that sense always uniquely determines reference along the 
lines of LICDR above (Smith and McIntyre 1982: chapter IV, section 3; 
Smith 1984; Searle 1983: chapter 8; Crane 2001: chapter 4). Appealing to 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations understanding of intentional content has 
already made clear how it is possible to think of intentional content as 
establishing reference in a context, insofar as on this view it is only 
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instantiations of intentional content types that actually succeed in 
referring. The question that remains and that must be answered in order 
to use this view of the content determines reference principle to deal 
with cases of indexical and demonstrative content is: what is the de-
scriptive or description-like content of essentially indexical thoughts? 
Here too the views of the early Husserl point toward an answer. In the 
Logical Investigations Husserl recognized the need for a distinction 
between what he called “objective” expressions on the one hand, and 
those that are “essentially occasional” on the other.”1 According to 
Husserl, essentially occasional expressions include both indexicals and 
demonstratives, and such expressions have two facets of meaning. The 
first is what Husserl calls a constant “semantic function” associated with 
particular indexical expressions. For example, “It is the universal se-
mantic function of the word ‘I’ to designate whoever is speaking…” 
(Husserl 2000: 316). John Searle calls such semantic functions “lexical 
meanings” and identifies them with a non-indexical descriptive compon-
ent associated with indexical expressions (Searle 1983: 224–5). Searle 
maintains that the lexical meaning of an indexical expression will spe-
cify both the kind of relationship that must obtain between a speaker’s 
utterance and features of the context of her utterance (spatial proximity, 
relations of proximity in time, conversational direction, etc.), as while as 
what kinds of things are to be related to the utterance (instants of time, 
the speaker, the listener, locations, etc.). Thus ‘you’ lexically means “the 
very person (kind of thing) being addressed by (kind of relation) this 
utterance”. Husserl recognizes, as does Searle, that for the reasons sug-
gested by Perry’s discussion of the essential indexical, the sentences ex-
pressing these semantic functions or lexical meanings cannot simply be 
substituted for indexicals without affecting the meaning of sentences 
containing them (Perry 2000: 315). This makes it necessary to identify a 
second facet or component of indexical content.   
                                       
1 According to Husserl, an objective expression is one that, “…pins down (or can 
pin down) its meaning merely by its manifest, auditory pattern, and can be under-
stood without necessarily directing one’s attention to the person uttering it, or to the 
circumstances of the utterance” (Husserl 2000: 314). An essentially occasional ex-
pression by contrast is, “…an expression that “belongs to a conceptually unified 
group of possible meanings, in whose case it is essential to orient actual meaning to 
the occasion, the speaker and the situation” (Husserl 2000: 315).  
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To deal with this, Husserl proposes a distinction between the semantic 
function or “indicating meaning” of indexicals, which remains constant 
from use to use, and the “indicated” meaning of indexicals, which is fun-
damentally cued to certain features of the speaker and context of utter-
ance. Thus the “indicating meaning” of ‘I’ is always “whoever is now 
speaking”, but the indicated meaning of its use on a given occasion is 
keyed to the “self-awareness” or “self-presentation” of the speaker on 
that occasion. In general, the indicating meaning of an indexical will 
specify some general relationship between the utterance of a sentence 
and some feature of the speaker’s conscious awareness or perceptually 
given environment, while the indicated meaning will be determined by 
what the speaker is actually aware of in the context in which the 
sentence is uttered. In the case of many indexicals, such as ‘you’ and 
‘here’ their indicating meaning may be supplied in part by demonstrative 
pointing to features of the immediate perceptual environment. Thus, 
Husserl writes, “The meaning of ‘here’ is in part universal and con-
ceptual [semantic function/indicating meaning], inasmuch as it always 
names a place as such, but to this universal element the direct place-
presentation [indicating meaning] attaches, varying from case to case” 
(Husserl 2000: 317–18). John Searle incorporates this same feature in his 
own account of indexicals by requiring that, in many cases, an “aware-
ness of the context of utterance” on the part of speakers and hearers of 
indexical expressions will be necessary in order to fully establish their 
reference (Searle 1983: 225–7). 
So, here we have a two-part account of indexical thought and refer-
ence. Every indexical expression has a general semantic function or 
lexical meaning which specifies that an utterance of it must stand in a 
certain relation to a particular kind of thing, such as the speaker, the 
listener, a time or a place and etc. Since thinking that “the speaker of this 
sentence is tall” is not, following Perry, the same as believing that “I am 
tall”, an “indicating meaning” or immediate awareness of presentations 
of features of the context of thought and utterance is identified as a 
second meaning component necessary in order to specify the full content 
and hence the reference of an indexical thought on a given occasion. In 
order for such an account to be an internalist account of indexical con-
tent, however, more needs to be said about what is involved in the con-
tent of the awareness of features of the context of utterance. Husserl’s 
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discussion of the “self-presentation” of the speaker as playing the role of 
“indicating meaning” in a context is helpful, but not sufficiently detailed 
as it stands. He points in the direction of a solution to the problem, how-
ever, when he writes, 
Properly speaking, we should not suppose that the immediate pre-
sentation of the speaker sums up the entire meaning of the word ‘I’. 
The word is certainly not to be regarded as an equivocal expression, 
with meanings to be identified with all possible proper names of per-
sons. Undoubtedly the idea of self-reference, as well as an implied 
pointing to the individual idea of the speaker, also belong, after a 
certain fashion, to the word’s meaning.” (Husserl 2000: 316) 
Husserl does not develop further the insights expressed in this passage, 
however I think that it is the notions of “self-reference” and of an 
“implied pointing to the individual idea [content-token] of the speaker” 
that are crucial in understanding the nature of internalist indexical 
content. John Searle makes this the central feature of his own internalist 
account of both indexical and demonstrative content. According to 
Searle, the contents of indexical thoughts are “self-referential” in the 
sense that such thoughts are themselves included in or made reference to 
by their own conditions of satisfaction.1 What this means is that in order 
for such thoughts to be accurate, in order for the world to be the way 
which they present it as being, something must be true of that very 
thought itself. The thought content “this thought is false” is self-
referential in this sense. The world will be the way such a thought 
presents it as being only if something is the case regarding this very 
thought, namely that it is false.2 In the case of indexicals, what must be 
true of the thought itself is that it must indeed stand in the relationships 
specified by the lexical meaning of the indexical thought that it is (‘I’, 
‘here’, ‘now’, etc.) to the kinds of object the lexical meaning specifies. 
                                       
1 John Searle’s discussion of the self-referentiality of indexical content is re-
markably short, and he discusses the matter in terms of speech-acts and utterances 
rather than in terms of the content of such acts and utterances, which makes it even 
more difficult to follow exactly what his view of the matter is.  The following is an 
attempt, following Searle, to articulate the matter specifically in terms of content.  
For Searle’s own discussion, see Searle (1983: 222–4).  
2 I leave aside here consideration of the paradox that such a thought generates, as it 
does not apply to the case of self-referential indexical content. 
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That the appropriate relationship does obtain between a thought and the 
object it is about on a given occasion, however, is something that a sub-
ject must determine by reference to her immediate conscious awareness 
of the relevant features of the context of her own thought as well as to 
her own awareness of the thought itself.  
Thus, when a subject thinks the thought “I am hungry” on a given 
occasion, the subject presents the world as being such that “the thinker 
of this very thought is hungry” and she understands that she is the 
thinker of this thought based on her immediate acquaintance with or 
awareness of the thought as hers, something that is indeed irreducibly in-
dexical, but nevertheless internal to the subject’s experience. 
David Woodruff Smith has proposed a more elaborate account of 
indexical content along these same lines. Smith challenges the often-
made assumption that intentional content of the sort under discussion 
here must necessarily be descriptive content. Rather, he suggesets that 
there is another type of intentional content, that involved in experiences 
of direct acquaintance or intuition such as perception and introspection, 
and that this content, though it does present the world as being a certain 
way, does not do so by describing objects as having certain properties.  
Smith treats indexical expressions as a “generic form of acquaintance 
shared [by thoughts] on different occasions of uttering the term” (Smith 
1981: 106). A “form of acquaintance” always involves a kind or 
structure of intentional experience and reference to whatever kind of 
object plays the “appropriate” role in that kind of experience, where the 
appropriate role can be understood as determined by the lexical rule for 
indexicals of that type (e.g. “the thinker of this very thought in experi-
ences involving ‘I’, something the subject has access to based on im-
mediate awareness of her possession of her own thoughts; “the time at 
which this thought is occurring” in experiences involving ‘now’, which 
is something that a subject has access to based on her conscious aware-
ness of her location in the flow of subjective time). Where the object that 
plays the “appropriate” role will be given by what Searle called the 
“lexical role” for the indexical, though again, actually picking out or 
establishing reference to this object on a given occasion will require the 
subject to take account of structural features of her immediate first-
person conscious awareness; features that, not surprisingly, will not 
always be describable in third-person terms.   
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Thus, maintaining an internalist perspective about intentional content 
in the case of indexicals requires (i) adopting the LICDR version of the 
content determines reference principle, (ii) acknowledging the self-
referential nature of indexical thought contents, and (iii) recognizing 
indexical thought contents as establishing their reference, in a given con-
text, based on a more basic but still intentional kind of direct acquaint-
ance that subjects have with their own thoughts, experiences and percep-
tions. Once this is done, it becomes possible to view indexical thought 
contents as instantiating a single meaning scheme Mx for each type of 
indexical thought (“Ix” for ‘I’, “Hx” for ‘here’, and etc.). This meaning 
scheme consists of a general lexical rule, including a self-referential 
component stipulating the relationship that a thought or utterance of this 
indexical type must stand in to its object in order for reference to be 
successful, along with a generic structure or form of conscious acquaint-
ance (such as self-awareness, introspection or perception) that non-
descriptively (non-linguistically) presents the world as containing an 
object or objects that stand in the appropriate relations or play the appro-
priate role specified by the lexical rule.  
On this view, what a token of an indexical type of content (such as ‘I’) 
refers to on a given occasion will depend on whose thought the com-
bination of the lexical meaning and first-personal acquaintance for that 
content on that occasion are instantiated in. Thus, when Hume thinks “I 
am Hume” the self-referential nature of the content involved in his 
thought in conjunction with his own direct acquaintance with himself 
refers to him, its conditions of satisfaction are “the person thinking this 
thought, “I”, is Hume”, while when Heimson thinks “I am Hume” the 
self-referential nature of the content involved in his thought is the same 
but, given that it is instantiated in his thought content rather than in 
Hume’s, it refers to him. And since Hume and Heimson are indeed dif-
ferent, what Heimson says is false while what Hume says is true, even 
though they have expressed tokens of a type identical content (Searle 
1983: 226–7). In other words, if the intentional content scheme for the 
indexical ‘I’ is Ix, then both Hume and Heimson think the thought type 
“Ix am David Hume”. However, the content scheme “Ix” only refers once 
it is embedded in the context of a given thinker’s thought and expression 
and tied to the immediate acquaintance that that thinker has with the 
structure of his own experience. Since Hume only has immediate access 
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in the way required by the indexical scheme Ix to his own experience, 
while Heimson has access only to his own conscious experience, the 
intentional basis upon which the reference of ‘I’ is fixed in the two uses 
is different (one is Hume’s and the other is Heimson’s) and thus the 
referents are different as well, even though the content tokens are type-
identical, that is to say, qualitatively the same. 
The crucial feature of this account of indexical thought content is its 
appeal to features of immediate experience or acquaintance to ground 
the reference of self-referential indexical thought in a given context. 
Though the relevant notion of acquaintance as a non-descriptive form of 
intentionality requires more development than it has been given here,1 
only its complete unworkability would represent a fundamental obstacle 
to an account something like the one sketched here. I take it that the 
guiding idea for Husserl, Searle, and Smith is that each of us has a 
unique first personal awareness of our own occurrent thoughts and of the 
way in which they present the world as being. In the case of indexical 
thoughts, the indexical presentation of the world takes advantage of this 
first-person awareness of the thought-content as “my” (the speaker/ 
thinker’s) content in order to present the world, time, location, and/or 
other speakers as standing in a certain relationship to the speaker and her 
current thought. This point about first-personal access is quite arguably 
supported rather than undermined by Perry’s discussion of the essen-
tiality of indexicals, and thus represents, at the very least, a plausible 
alternative direction to that of taking indexical thoughts to be externally 
individuated or exhausted by their referents.   
Further, since the options available for linguistically expressing in-
dexical content are either to use indexicals, or to eliminate them in favor 
of non-indexical statements with the same truth-conditions, and since the 
latter are, due to the unique self-referential and first-personal nature of 
indexical content, not equivalent in meaning (even if they are equivalent 
in truth) to the former, it follows that the full content of indexical 
thoughts can only be expressed in sentences containing indexicals, 
which is fully consistent with Perry’s arguments for the essentiality of 
indexicals. 
                                       
1 Smith himself has further developed the relevant notion of acquaintance in Smith 
(1989).  
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To summarize, an internalist account of indexical content requires re-
jecting the strict Fregean content determines reference principle. Once 
this is done, it is possible to understand the meaning of indexicals as 
given by a meaning scheme “Mx”, consisting of their lexical content (a 
general meaning or semantic function that is always the same and in-
cludes the specification of ways in which thoughts with this indexical 
content must be related to other objects in order to refer) and by the 
generic form of certain kinds of immediate acquaintance or awareness 
that subjects can have with features of their experience and environment. 
Viewing indexicals in this way makes it possible to construe indexical 
intentional content as a kind of content that is as essentially indexical as 
the first person nature of acquaintance with one’s own experiences is 
essentially first-personal, a result consistent with and to some extent 
supported by Perry’s discussion of the essential nature of indexicals.  
A full account of indexical content, however, such as the content 
associated with ‘here’ or ‘you’, requires that subjects be able to pick out, 
based on perceptual awareness, objects and features in their surrounding 
environments. This picking out will be demonstrative in nature, and so 
an internalist account of indexical content is only complete if there is 
also some account of internal demonstrative content.  It is to the discus-
sion of such an account that I now turn. 
5.2 A Basic Internalist Account of Demonstrative Content 
As John Perry concludes for Frege, so David Woodruff Smith and 
Ronald McIntyre conclude of Husserl that he never fully appreciated the 
problem posed by demonstrative thought and reference, and therefore 
also never adequately solved it (Perry 1977; Smith and McIntyre 1982). 
Demonstratives present a problem for an internalist committed to the 
strict sense determines reference principle because they seem to involve 
very little internal or descriptive content, and because Twin Earth style 
cases can be constructed in which use of a demonstrative by internal 
mental duplicates in different contexts clearly establishes reference to 
different objects or extensions. As with indexicals, so with demonstrate-
ives, the strategy for providing an internalist account of them is (a) to 
reject the strict Fregean content determines reference principle in favor 
of a weaker version such as LICDR, and (b) to develop an account of the 
nature of internal demonstrative content that ties it to features of the 
immediate experience of subjects of thought. 
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Both D. W. Smith and John Searle have offered accounts of what the 
internal intentional content or sense of perceptions, and by extension of 
demonstratives, is (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 219, ftnt. 32; Smith 1984; 
Searle 1983: chapters 2 & 8). Smith’s basic proposal is that the content 
of a perception is “the content “this (now here before me and affecting 
my eyes)” (Smith and McIntyre1983: 219, ftnt. 32). Similarly, John 
Searle’s view is that part of the conditions of satisfaction for a per-
ceptual intention are “the very object that is now causing my percep-
tion”. Searle refers to this as the causal self-referentiality of the content 
of perceptual intentions, which is similar to the self-referentiality of 
indexical contents discussed above. The basic idea in both accounts is 
that when a subject undergoes a perceptual experience in which she 
directs her attention at a specific object, part of the meaning of that ex-
perience for the subject is that the very object that she seems to see (with 
whatever qualities she intends it descriptively as having) is actually there 
before her just as she seems to see it and playing a role in affecting her 
senses and causing her experience of it. The point is not that most sub-
jects (if any, other than philosophers) actually think these words when 
they undergo perceptual experiences, rather, the point is that it is part of 
the content of the experience of perception itself, part of the mode or 
way in which subjects direct their thoughts perceptually towards the 
world, and so part of the conditions of satisfaction for such thoughts, 
that the objects so intended are experienced as caught up in and affecting 
the very perception of them. Since a demonstrative such as ‘this’ or 
‘that’ is used on the basis of perception (and often in conjunction with 
some kind of pointing) to establish reference, the meaning of demon-
strative expressions can be viewed as depending or relying on the more 
basic kind of content involved in perceptual intentionality (e.g. “that red 
round apple” has the conditions of satisfaction, “the red round apple here 
before me and affecting my experience of it).  
On such a view of the intentional content of perception it is not perc-
eptual sense or content alone, but content in conjunction with context 
that determines completely which object a perceptual intention refers to.1 
                                       
1 The basic picture under discussion here is similar to that suggested by John Heil in 
his own intuitive response to the implications of Twin Earth for the internalism 
externalism debate. “Pretend for a moment that the directedness of your thoughts 
resembled dart tossing. Gravitational influences aside, the direction a dart takes 
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As Searle puts it, this means that type-identical tokens of the same per-
ceptual state (tokens including all descriptive and qualitative content in 
common) may yet, in virtue of the causal self-referentiality of perceptual 
content, still refer to different objects in different contexts (for example, 
XYZ on Twin Earth as opposed to H2O on Earth) (Searle1983: 207–9). 
The same is true on Smith’s account, and in virtue of this both the 
accounts of Searle and of Smith and McIntyre involve accepting the 
Husserlian content determines reference principle, LICDR.1 The in-
ternalist account of indexical content is thus extended and supplemented 
by an internalist account of demonstrative content.   
5.3 Back to Twin Earth  
And this makes it possible to explain what is happening in Putnam’s 
Twin Earth case in a way that is consistent with the standard com-
mitments of internalism, that content determines reference and that psy-
chological features of the subject alone determine content. The reference 
of a natural kind term such as ‘water’, understood as Putnam under-
stands it, is determined by (i) demonstrative pointing to a paradigm (ii) 
                                                                                                                    
depends wholly on agent-centered factors: how you grip the dart, the character of 
your arm motion, the timing of the release, and the like. Although a dart’s trajectory 
depends wholly on the agent, what the dart hits depends on features of the world, 
features over which an agent might have no control. When you toss a dart aimed at 
the center of a target, it will not hit the center if I move the target while the dart is in 
flight. We might sum this up by saying that what a dart hits depends on two factors: 
how it is tossed — its agent-determined trajectory — and how the world is” (Heil 
2004: 235).  
1 Smith and McIntyre discuss the implications of their view for the strong content 
determines reference principle in the following passage: “Now, the object of per-
ception is not a function of the content alone, for another perception on another 
occasion could in principle have the very same phenomenological content and yet 
have a different object.  That is, there is not a functional, or many-one, relation 
between the content and the object of a perception (contra Husserl). Still, it seems, 
the demonstrative content of a perception — the content “this (now here before me 
and affecting my eyes)” — does prescribe the object of the perception, the object 
appropriately before the perceiver and affecting his sense on the occasion of the 
perception. However, it is not the noematic content in itself that so prescribes the 
object; rather, it is the content only insofar as it is embodied in that particular 
perceptual experience on that occasion — if you will, the demonstrative content-in-
the-perception prescribes, or is satisfied by, the object of the perception, the object 
contextually before the perceiver” (Smith and McIntyre 1982: 219, ftnt. 32).  
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on the basis of certain superficial identifying features of the paradigm 
that make it possible to identify other instance of the kind, but (iii) with 
the intention to refer only to things relevantly similar in underlying 
microstructure (or some other scientifically significant feature) to the 
original paradigm. A subject on Earth and a subject on Twin Earth can 
both instantiate type identical tokens of this content in fixing the 
reference of their terms ‘water’, however, the self-referential nature of 
the demonstrative element of the content ensures that the Earth in-
dividual is, in fact, establishing reference to H2O, while the Twin Earth 
individual is establishing reference to XYZ. And now all of this is 
explained by the internal intentional contents of these two subjects.  
6. Conclusion  
In the foregoing I have introduced the traditional account of inten-
tionality as a kind of content internalism and considered the way in 
which it is challenged by now standard anti-internalist arguments such 
as those based on the Twin Earth thought experiment of Hilary Putnam. 
I have argued that anti-internalist arguments are successful only on a 
very strict reading of the content determines reference principle, and on 
the assumption that it is not possible to provide a cogent account of the 
descriptive or quasi-discriptive content of indexical and demonstrative 
thoughts. The view of intentional content defended by Husserl in the 
Logical Investigations motivates modifying the content determines refer-
ence principle to allow for the possibility that different instantiations of 
the same content-type may refer to different objects in different contexts, 
while the conjunction of this view with the development of Husserl’s 
own discussion of indexical and demonstrative thought and reference by 
John Searle and D. W. Smith, among others, makes it possible to pro-
vide a plausible and motivated account of internalist intentional content 
for indexicals and demonstratives. Content internalism, so understood, is 
not susceptible to standard anti-internalist arguments and retains all of 
the explanatory benefits of the traditional distinction between the content 
and the object of thought as well.  
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